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Pastoralist Economic Behavior: 
Empirical Results from Reindeer 
Herders in Northern Sweden 
Giiran Bostedt 
This paper presents a model of  pastoralists,  as illustrated by  reindeer herders, 
together with an analysis based on a cross-sectional data set on Swedish reindeer- 
herding Saami. The intrinsic utility of  being an active reindeer herder plays an 
important role in determining supply. Results show this can lead to unconventional 
supply responses among pastoralists, and suggest that  the probability of a backward- 
bending supply response increases with stock size. Further analyses confirm that 
reindeer herders with backward-bending supply curves have significantly larger 
herds than herders with conventional supply responses. Relaxed externalities from 
forestry would cause most herders to increase their slaughter. 
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Introduction 
Pastoralism can be defined as a subsistence system in which a group of  people make 
their living by tending herds of  large herbivores, found in various parts of  the world 
(O'Neil, 2002). Pastoralists are usually distinguished from (for example) cattle farmers 
by certain features, all of  which may not be present for certain pastoralists. These 
characteristics include: 
Natural Pastures. This feature is perhaps the most important (Salzman, 1996),  and 
implies that pastoralists usually have access to free and natural grazing resources, 
although the abundance is limited and generally difficult to control. Pastoralism 
is therefore often an adaptation to natural conditions, which for certain reasons 
(such as arid or cold climates) may not be suitable for farming (Barfield, 1997). 
Consequently, one simply does not observe high-density, sedentary populations of 
pastoralists, since any land capable of  supporting these animal herds is devoted to 
agriculture. 
Subsistence. This term indicates that many pastoralists raise their animals both 
for direct consumption as well as for exchange value, although the level of  inter- 
action with the market economy varies. 
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Indigenous Peoples. Pastoralism is mainly practiced by people who are  regarded as 
indigenous because of their descent from the populations who inhabited the country 
(or a geographical region to which the country belongs) at  the time of conquest or 
colonization or the  establishment of present state  boundaries. Pastoralists usually 
also retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political institu- 
tions, irrespective of their legal status. Well-known pastoralist societies include the 
Maasai and the Bedouins in Africa, the Mongols and ethnic Tibetans in Asia, and 
the Saami in northern Scandinavia and Russia (@Neil, 2002). 
Despite low profitability, many pastoralists are reluctant to give up animal herding 
altogether, due to the cultural identity connected with the activity. The close relation- 
ship with their animals is actually an  important characteristic of pastoralists. The 
identity of pastoralists is in many cases based on the close association with their 
livestock that  forms a key component of their social and ritual life-suggesting  most 
pastoralists have other objectives beyond profit or income maximization. This feature, 
in combination with the limited and sensitive grazing resources and other special 
circumstances surrounding the pastoralist way of life, makes modeling and empirical 
analyses of  the pastoralist economic behavior an interesting challenge. Yet, few 
economic studies focusing exclusively on pastoralists have been conducted. Among the 
exceptions are  the  theoretical papers by Livingstone (1986),  who addresses the common 
property problem, and Skonhoft (1999),  who compares a standard profit-maximization 
model with a stock-maximizing model. Scarpa et al. (2003) conducted one of  the few 
empirical studies, using choice experiments and hedonic data to compare value 
estimates  for cattle attributes among the  Maasai in Kenya. Although interesting in their 
own right, these studies provide no empirical data on the individual behavior and pref- 
erences of the pastoralist. 
The Saami, northern Scandinavia's and Russia's indigenous people, practice a form 
of transhumance pastoralism1  (e.g., Borgerhoff Mulder and Sellen, 1994),  involving the 
reindeer (Rangifer tarandus). In Sweden, reindeer husbandry is an  exclusive right for 
the Saami, and the reindeer has been domesticated by the Saami  for at  least as  long as 
there is written evidence (the oldest documents date from about 880 AD). As of 2001, 
there were approximately 220,000 reindeer in Sweden, owned by about 4,500 reindeer 
 herder^,^ all of whom belong to one of the 51  Swedish Saami villages (Swedish National 
Board of Agriculture, 2002). Although the reindeer herders of  today use modern 
equipment such as snowmobiles and mobile slaughterhouses, the basics of  reindeer 
husbandry have changed fairly little over the centuries. The reindeer are  allowed, with 
some exceptions, to follow their yearly cycle and search for natural grazing grounds, 
permitting grazing grounds to replenish themselves as  the  reindeer move from the high 
mountains to the coast and back again. Thus, reindeer husbandry requires large areas. 
In Sweden, the Reindeer Husbandry Act gives the Saami the right to let their reindeer 
graze on, for instance, private forestland. In total, the Saami have grazing rights on 
about 40% of the Swedish land area. 
Transhumance  pastoralists  follow a cyclical pattern of migrations that usually take them from cooler, high altitude areas 
in the summer to warmer lowland areas in the winter. Because transhumance pastoralists generally depend somewhat less 
on their animals for food than nomadic pastoralists, they are thus more likely to sell the offtake in the market. 
This number includes approximately 1,000 concession reindeer herders who, by special government permit, practice 
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Approximately 75% of the forest area in the three northernmost counties in Sweden 
is used for winter grazing of reindeer (Eriksson, Sandewall, and Wilhelmsson, 1987). 
The primary food source during winter is lichen, which mainly grows on the ground 
(e.g., Cladina rangiferina), and on trees (e.g., Alectoria sarmentosa and Bryoria 
fuscescens). Because other food sources are scarce, lichen availability in winter is a 
critical factor for reindeer survival (Gustavsson, 1989; Skogland, 1986;  Virtala, 1992). 
In winter, ground lichen in a clearcut area may be completely inaccessible due to snow 
cover, leaving tree lichen as the only means of  sustenance for the herds. However, as 
reported by Essen, Renhorn, and Pettersson (1996), spruce trees must be older than 
80-100 years to support high tree lichen mass. A forest in northern Sweden is typically 
clearcut after 80-120  years, creating a scarcity of  older forest stands (Berries, 1996). 
Thus, by affecting winter grazing resources, harvesting older stands for timber produc- 
tion imposes a negative unidirectional externality on reindeer husbandry. 
Even if only a minority of the  approximately 20,000 Swedish Saami  (the  total number 
depends on how the ethnic group is defined) today are active reindeer herders, the 
importance of reindeer husbandry for the Saami culture can hardly be overemphasized 
(Riksdagens Revisorer, 1996).  Most Saami have family members or other relatives who 
are  reindeer owners, making the reindeer an  integral part of the Saami  way of life. The 
Swedish government, both in official statements  and  through different tj.pes of subsidies 
and compensations, has also emphasized the importance of reindeer husbandry as a 
cornerstone in the Saami culture. 
Using a developed version of the dynamic economic model of a pastoralist (as 
presented in Bostedt, 20011, the  objective of this study is  to empirically analyze a unique 
cross-sectional data set on the preferences of  the Swedish reindeer herding Saami 
community. The remainder of the paper proceeds as  follows. In the theoretical section, 
a dynamic model is presented for a reindeer herder who might have other objectives in 
addition to profit maximization, leading to testable hypotheses about the reindeer 
herder's supply of  slaughtered reindeer. Here, the intrinsic utility of  being an active 
reindeer herder plays an important role in determining supply. An analysis of the  cross- 
sectional data set is then provided in the empirical section. This data set is based on a 
survey of Swedish reindeer herders by Statistics Sweden, and the  analysis is conducted 
with a focus on supply effects of changes in prices and externalities from forestry. Some 
concluding remarks are offered in the final section. 
The Pastoralist Model 
The Utility Maximization Problem 
The theoretical model presented here draws on the model developed by Bostedt (20011, 
which in turn has connections to other models of agricultural households (e.g., Singh, 
Squire, and Strauss, 1986), as well as models of  self-employed forest owners (e.g., 
Johansson and Lofgren, 1985, chapter 7). The basis for the analysis is a utility- 
maximizing pastoralist, such as a reindeer herder, who decides upon private consump- 
tion (C),  the size of hisher herd of livestock, e.g., reindeer in the case of the Saami (R), 
and the time devoted to work unrelated to the livestock (1,). 
Assume that the pastoralist maximizes a utility function of the form U[C, Rl, where 
dUIdR > 0 can be seen as an expression of the pleasure derived from being an active 384  August2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
reindeer herder (which is increasing in R). The livestock argument is included in the 
utility function to represent the notion that the herd of livestock provides an intrinsic 
utility of  its own for an active pastoralist. Several government reports in Sweden (e.g., 
Riksdagens Revisorer, 1996; Swedish Ministry of  Finance, 1998) have noted the low 
profitability among Swedish reindeer herding companies. Yet, these companies persist 
despite the financial disadvantages-emphasizing the point discussed earlier that the 
cultural importance of  reindeer husbandry clearly extends beyond its value as merely 
a source of  income. 
Essentially, the utility function states  that the pastoralistvalues private consumption 
and being an active herder, as represented by the size of the herd. This formulation can 
be regarded as a form of  middle-ground between a pure profit-maximization model, 
which ignores the intrinsic utility provided by the herd, and the likewise extreme stock- 
maximization model suggested by Skonhoft (1999),  which does not include consumption 
as a maximand. Means for private consumption (C)  come from two sources: profits from 
herding, n(h,  R), and labor income from work unrelated to the livestock, I,, which is paid 
with the wage rate, w. Specifically: 
(1)  C = n(h,  R) + wl,, 
where h is the number of slaughtered  animal^.^ Since most reindeer herding companies 
are small, price-taking behavior is a reasonable assumption. The formulation in (1) 
implicitly assumes some market exchange in meat, so that when slaughtered animals 
are retained for personal consumption they are withheld from this market, and thus 
"sold" to the herder's family. 
The pastoralist7s  livestock not only entails management costs, it also takes time. One 
basis for the pastoralist model is that pastoralists can obtain all, or part, of their income 
from the livestock they own.  Using Swedish reindeer herders as an example, the 
Swedish National Board of  Agriculture (1998) states that a reindeer herding family 
company requires more than 400 reindeer for the family to be  able to receive its 
livelihood completely from its reindeer husbandry. With about 220,000 reindeer and 915 
reindeer herding companies in 2001 (Swedish  National Board of Agriculture, 2002), the 
average number of  reindeer per company is only 240 animals. Furthermore, according 
to an income survey in a report prepared for the Swedish Parliament Auditors 
(Riksdagens  Revisorer, 1996),  the average  reindeer-herder household received only 19% 
of  its income from reindeer herding. This means that alternative sources of income are 
important for most reindeer herders and influence how much time should be devoted to 
the reindeer herding company. This holds true for other types of  pastoralists as well, as 
evidenced by the fact that the Maasai are increasingly engaged in the tourism industry 
in Kenya and Tanzania, while the Bedouin often are recruited into the armed forces of 
their countries where they are  especially  valued as scouts and trackers. Alarge livestock 
herd takes a great deal of  time to manage (rounding up the animals for branding or 
slaughter, moving them from winter to summer grazing grounds, etc.). However, high 
prices on meat make the tradeoff between the pastoralist lifestyle and other occupa- 
tional alternatives more advantageous for the former. 
This formulation does not distinguish between adult animals and calves; i.e., h represents a standardized animal, 
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Time used for work unrelated to the livestock (1,) is defined as total time minus time 
allocated to work managing the livestock herd (including  rounding up animals, branding, 
and slaughtering), i.e.: 
where T is total time (leisure time is assumed to be fixed and already excluded), and 
l1(R)  is a function determining the  time to manage the livestock as a function of the herd 
size. The reason why time allocated to managing the livestock herd is a function of the 
herd size is that a large reindeer herd takes a great deal of  time to manage; thus, it 
would be unreasonable to  assume a reindeer herder with a large herd would not allocate 
this time. However, economies of scale are assumed to exist, so that dll(R)ldR > 0, while 
a2l1(R)ldR2  < 0. The question of empirical verification of this assumption will be 
addressed in a later section. 
Consequently,  based on preferences for consumption and the  intrinsic utility of being 
an active pastoralist (represented by the stock of reindeer), the reindeer herder simul- 
taneously decides upon whether to work outside of reindeer husbandry (and if so, how 
much) and how many reindeer to slaughter-which  in turn affects consumption, the 
livestock, and the time that must be allocated to livestock management. Inserting (1) 
and (2) into the utility function gives: 
Livestock growth is  assumed to  be a continuous function of the stock (R) and the  grazing 
resource, i.e., lichen (L)  in the case of reindeer, minus the number of slaughtered animals 
(h): 
where f(R, L) is the natural growth function for the livestock stock. This function is 
assumed to have the usual features of a compensatory growth function, i.e., f  (R, L) = 0 
when R = 0 and at the carrying capacity. The derivative with respect to the stock is 
written as df(R, L)IdR = f,  = 0 at some maximum sustainable yield stock, while the 
second derivative is specified as  a2f (R, L)laR2  =  fm < 0 (see Clark, 1990). The size of the 
carrying capacity stock is assumed to depend on available grazing resources, such as 
lichen in the case of reindeer. Lichen is not fxed, but is regarded as exogenous in the 
growth function from the perspective of  the individual reindeer herder. This is due 
partly to the fact that we are considering one representative reindeer herder with a 
negligible effect on the communal grazing resource, and partly due to the important 
negative externalities caused by forestry (e.g., Parks, Bostedt, and Kristrom, 2002; 
Bostedt, Parks, and Boman, 2003). Thus, the individual reindeer herder does not exercise 
control of the lichen resource. 
Maximizing the  present value of an  infinite4  stream of utilities with respect to the  two 
controls (h and l,), and where r is the discount rate, subject to the restriction given by 
(41, gives the following current-valued Hamiltonian: 
M&mizing  to infinity is strictly speakingnot correct, but is  used for convenience.  Amore precise objective would involve 
maximizing over expected life and including a bequest value for heirs. Such an objective function would complicate the 
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First-Order Conditions 
The optimum levels of h and 1, and the steady-state equilibrium may be determined 
from the necessary conditions of the Hamiltonian in (5): 
and 
The partial derivative with respect to the harvest states that the marginal benefit of 
harvest (which increases private consumption in the utility function) must be weighed 
against the effects of  harvest on the stock through the shadow price on the growth 
constraint, A.  The co-state equation in (6b) can perhaps be more easily interpreted if re- 
written as r - i/A.  = fR + URIA.  Here, the left-hand side can be described as the "own 
rate" of  interest for the stock R, a rate which is not observable in the marketplace 
(Hartwick, 2001), and which must be equal to the marginal rate of growth on this stock 
plus the marginal utility of  increasing the stock divided by the shadow price on the 
growth constraint. 
Steady-State Solution 
To analyze the  solution to the  optimal harvesting problem, we must determine the  prop- 
erties of the steady-state solution. To do this, set i  = 0 and R = 0. Using (6a) to cancel 
out A.  gives a steady-state solution, which is defined by: 
au  ac  an  au  ac  an  [ ;;  ] all  au  [ au  ac  an]  af  r---=-----  w  -+-+  ---  -  [ ac  an  ah]  ac  an  aR  a~  a~  ac  an  ah  a~  ' 
Dividing through with the marginal utility of consumption aUlaC gives: 
ac  an  ac  an  all  auia~ [aC an]  af  r--  =---w-+-+  --  - 
[an  ah]  an  aR  aR  auiac  an  ah  aR . 
Since from (I),  aC/an = 1, we have the equilibrium condition: 
Functional Forms 
To obtain more unequivocal results, assume the following specific functional forms: Bostedt  Pastoralist Economic Behavior  387 
where 0 < lx < 1. This Cobb-Douglas  functional form makes R an essential good, reflect- 
ing the actual situation (refer to table 2, presented later). The parameter a is a taste 
parameter representing the individual taste for private consumption. Furthermore, it 
is assumed: 
(11)  dh,  R) = ph - cR(R), 
where p is the price per slaughtered animal net of  slaughtering cost, and where the 
management cost for reindeer, c,(R)  is increasing in R. 
From (10) and (ll),  we obtain: 
dU/aR  - 1  -  cx  --  -  (ph - cR(R)  + w12)  ,  auiac  a~ 
giving the following specific form of  (9): 
Comparative Statics 
The steady-state solution (15)  has four exogenous variables:~,  w, L, and r. It is reason- 
able to assume regional and even individual variation in the first three, since prices of 
reindeer meat may vary, wages in alternative occupations may depend on  the labor 
market situation as well as on individual skills, and the lichen density may vary due to 
natural geographical conditions and regional variation in the intensity of  forestry. 
Marginal changes in harvesting can now be analyzed from marginal changes in these 
exogenous variables. 
We  first derive the following partial derivatives of  (15): 
Using (16) and (171, together with the fact that f  (R,  L) = h in steady-state, and totally 
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This derivative is quite difficult to sign. However, if dfldR  > r, then dhldp < 0, which 
means the supply curve will be backward-bending. The inequality af ldR > r will hold 
for most values of R <  RMsy,  i.e., if the reindeer stock is lower than the stock associated 
with maximum sustainable yield (MSY).  If r > af laR, the sign of  dhldp may still be 
negative for R > RMsy  if 1  - a is large relative to a-i.e.,  if the intrinsic utility of  being 
an active reindeer herder is important relative to private consumption.  This means that 
the phenomenon of backward-bending supply is consistent with the theoretical model. 
Generally, we can expect to find herders with both positive and negative supply 
responses, depending on the size of  their herd, what discount rate they use, and their 
private marginal intrinsic utility of  being an active herder. However, it is reasonable to 
assume that herders for whom 1  - a is large will also have large herds. 
To  illustrate the above reasoning, assume the growth function has the following 
specific logistic form: f(R, L) = yR(1 - (RIL)),  where y is the intrinsic growth rate. If 
y = 0.254 (as  suggested by Virtala, 19961, carrying capacity is arbitrarily set to 100, and 
a = 0.1 (i.e., the intrinsic utility of being an active reindeer herder is important relative 
to private consumption), then dhldp > 0 if R > 89. In contrast, if a = 0.9, then dhldp > 0 
if R > 46. Therefore, herders with a strong intrinsic utility of  being active herders are 
more likely to exhibit a negative supply response. Backward-bending supply responses 
have been described earlier in the context of  common property resources (see Copes, 
1970; Berck and Perloff, 1985; Clark, 1990). 
Using (16) and (181, and totally differentiating gives: 
Since the availability of lichen is largely determined by intensity of forestry, this deriva- 
tive is primarily an analysis of  the supply effects of  the forestry externality on reindeer 
husbandry. This supply effect can be signed by noting that a2f (R,  L)/dR aL > 0; marginal 
growth rates for reindeer will increase if lichen becomes more abundant, so (21) will 
have a negative sign. Put another way, the lichen increase  will make reindeer husbandry 
more profitable relative to other work, resulting in a higher equilibrium stock of 
reindeer. If harvest is equal to growth, then in combination with the negative sign on 
ahlaL, this must imply that equilibrium stocks are higher than RMsy.  Conversely, har- 
vest will increase if lichen becomes less abundant, due to the negative effect a reduction 
in lichen stock has on the carrying capacity of the reindeer. Thus, reducing lichen stocks 
by harvesting older stands for timber production imposes a negative unidirectional 
externality on reindeer husbandry. 
Using (16) and (19),  and totally differentiating gives: 
The sign of  this derivative depends on the size of  R. If R is small, then 1,  will be large, 
indicating that a negative sign on (22)  will be more likely. On the other hand, if R is so 
large that I,  = 0 (i.e., the herder receives all income from reindeer husbandry), then a Bostedt  Pastoralist Economic Behavior  389 
positive sign on (22)  is ensured. This is intuitive; the attraction of an alternative employ- 
ment increases if w increases, making it more expensive on the margin to keep the herd, 
which will drive the reindeer stock down. For a reindeer herder with a herd size above 
RMsy,  this stock reduction will generate a larger harvest. 
Empirical Analysis 
The Data 
In 1999, a mail survey of Swedish reindeer herders was conducted by Statistics Sweden 
(SCB) in collaboration with the National Association of  the Swedish Saami (Svenska 
Samers Riksforbund, SSR) and the Swedish University of  Agricultural Sciences. The 
survey  was sent to a random sample  of the Swedish national register of reindeer herding 
companies, and 316 completely or partially answered questionnaires were returned for 
a response rate  of 63%.  The survey,  which focused on attitudes and preferences, resulted 
in a unique cross-sectional  data set on the preferences of a typical transhumance pastor- 
alist community, the Swedish reindeer herding Saami.5  For purposes of this paper, only 
responses to selected questions are analyzed. To illustrate the representativness of the 
sample, some general characteristics of the sample may be compared with the national 
counterparts in table 1. Relevant portions of the questionnaire can be found in the 
appendix. 
As evident from table 1, the sample is skewed in the sense that reindeer herding 
companies with more than 200 reindeer are considerably overrepresented. Similarly, 
when examining geographical  distribution, reindeer herding companies  in  Vasterbotten 
and Jamtland counties are somewhat  overrepresented.  Consequently,  mean values from 
the sample are less likely to be representative for Swedish reindeer herding companies, 
but the skewness plays a less important role when the analysis controls for group size.6 
Empirical Results 
An empirical motivation for the formulation of  the utility function in the previous 
section can be found in the responses to the question, "How important is it  for you to be 
a reindeer herder?,,--detailed  in table 2. As clearly illustrated in table 2, the intrinsic 
utility of being an active reindeer herder is an essential argument in the utility function. 
There are no significant differences in reindeer herd size between respondents in the 
four different response categories. 
To gain some insight into the empirical justification for the formulation of  the 
consumption function in (I),  it is useful to study the responses to the question, "How 
important are the economic revenues of each year's slaughter?"  (table  3). More than 60% 
of the respondents chose response alternatives 1  or 2, and the mean reindeer stocks for 
those who chose those alternatives are larger than the mean stock for alternative 3. The 
mean reindeer  stock for those who  chose alternative  3 is in turn larger than the 
corresponding mean stock for alternative 4. These findings are logical, and suggest that 
Some results from the study are presented in a publication by the Swedish National Board of Agriculture (1998). 
'  Note that respondents gave information on reindeer herd size in six different reindeer group sizes: 0-99,  100-199, 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Respondents to Survey of Swedish Reindeer 
Herding Companies 
Variable 
Swey  Swedish 
Description  Sample (%)  Average (%) " 
Reindeer herding companies by size group  0-99  reindeer  11.7  34.6 
100-199 reindeer  15.5  21.5 
200-299 reindeer  27.2  16.0 
300-399 reindeer  16.4  8.9 
> 400 reindeer  29.1  18.8 
Reindeer herding companies by county  Norrbotten  70.2  76.5 
Vasterbotten  15.8  12.8 
Jlimtland  13.9  10.7 
" Source: National Register of Reindeer Herding Companies. 
Table 2. Responses to the Question: "How important is it fir you to be a reindeer 
herder?" 
Response Alternative 
No. of  Percent 
Responses  (%) 
1.  "I will quit as  a reindeer herder if I can find an  occupation that 
will provide the same income."  2  0.7 
2.  "I will quit as  a reindeer herder if I can find an  occupation that 
will provide a better income."  21  6.9 
3.  "I will not personally quit as  a reindeer herder."  113  37.3 
4.  "I will not personally quit as  a reindeer herder, and it is important 
to me that the next generation continues in the occuaation."  167  55.1 
- - 
Total Responses:  303 
Table 3. Responses to the Question: "How important are the economic revenues of 
each year's slaughter?" 
No. and  Mean 
Percent of  Reindeer Stock 
Response Alternative  Responses  [Coddence  Interval] 
1.  "The slaughter revenues determine if I can continue as  a  91  393.9 
reindeer herder or not."  (29.5%)  [362.9-425.01  ................................................................................. 
2.  "The slaughter revenues are important for my livelihood, but  98  316.3 
it  is the combination of revenues from slaughter, hunting, and  (31.8%)  [287.1-345.51 
fishing that determine if I can continue as a reindeer herder."  --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
3.  "Slaughter revenues are important, but I can supplement  62  282.2 
them with income from other occupations.  (20.1%)  L247.3-317.21  ................................................................................. 
4.  "Slaughter revenues only give a small contribution to my  45  187.8 
livelihood."  (14.6%)  [147.6-227.91 
5.  "Slaughter revenues are not important for my livelihood."  12  183.3 
(3.9%)  L80.8-285.91 
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possibilities to find reasonably well-paid alternative occupations greatly influence 
reindeer stock size. This result is in turn connected to the time constraint in (2),  where 
an increasing stock increases the number of  working hours in the reindeer enterprise, 
albeit at a decreasing rate. The concavity of  I,(R) in R can be verified from questions in 
the survey related to the number of  working hours in the reindeer enterprise. Fitting 
the regression equation I, = p,  + PI * Ln(R) to the survey responses yields a t-value of 
2.97 on P, (with 100 degrees of  freedom). 
To further examine the pastoralist7s  supply responses to changes in price, two 
questions were asked. Each respondent was first asked whether helshe would change 
the number of  slaughtered reindeer per year if the present price of  reindeer meat per 
kilogram was doubled. The choice alternatives to this question were: "I would reduce 
slaughter," "No change in slaughter," "I would increase slaughter," and "Don't know." 
The second question was similar, but requested a response to a halving of the price. The 
question format did not specify whether these price changes were temporary or 
permanent, leaving the respondent to form hisher own opinion about the duration of 
the price change (see appendix). 
On the basis of  the responses to these questions, two ordered probit regressions (cf. 
Zavoina and McElvey, 1975)  were then conducted to determine whether reindeer stock 
size influences the probability of  an increase in slaughter. In the first case, the depend- 
ent variable is the response to the question whether the respondent would change the 
slaughter following a 100% price increase, while in the second case, the dependent 
variable is the response to the question whether the respondent would change the 
slaughter following a 50% price decrease. Formally, we can define the vector of  choices 
available for the respondent in the first question as y, = slaughter decrease, y,  = no 
change, and y,  = slaughter increase. The log-likelihood function for the ordered probit 
regression on the first (price increase) question can then be defined as: 
where p  = pj. ,, ..., fi is the vector of  threshold parameters associated with the choices 
available for the respondent, and xi  denotes the data on the independent variables for 
respondent i. The log-likehood function for the second (price decrease) question can be 
defined in a similar manner. Results are reported in table 4. 
As observed from table 4, estimates for case 1  indicate that the reindeer herd size has 
a negative effect on the probability of  increasing slaughter after a 100%  price increase, 
although this variable is not significant  at  the 5% level. For case 2, estimates reveal that 
the reindeer herd size significantly contributes to predicting the responses to a 50% 
price decrease. These results confirm the backward-bending supply response predicted 
in the theoretical model. That herders with large herds seem to be more likely to exhibit 
this supply response may depend on a high private marginal intrinsic utility of  being 
an active herder [represented by a high value of  1  -  cc in equation (20)l. Indeed, strong 
preferences  for reindeer herding may be the very reason some herders have large herds. 
In these cases, a high utility may be connected to having a large herd. A price increase 
then allows a herder to slaughter fewer animals and still obtain the same level of 
income from reindeer husbandry. 
Combining the responses to the price increaseldecrease questions enables a closer 
examination, as presented in table 5. As many as 16%  of  the respondents answered 
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Table 4. Results from Ordered Probit Regressions of Responses to Questions 
Concerning Change in Slaughter After Price IncreaseDecrease 
CASE 1  CASE 2 
Dependent Variable:  Dependent Variable: 
Rob. of increase in slaughter  Rob.  of increase in slaughter 
after 100%  price increase  after 50% price decrease 
Description  Coefficient  t-Value  Coefficient  t-Value 
Constant 
Reindeer Stock 
No. of observations  291 
Log likelihood  -175.01 
Correctly predicted observations  80% 
Note: Responses  were coded as  follows: 0 = slaughter decrease, 1  = no change, and 2 = slaughter increase. All "don't know" 
answers were removed. 
Table 5. Number of Respondents (n),  Mean (%),  and Standard Deviation of Rein- 
deer Herd Sizes, Distributed According to Responses to Questions Concerning 
Change in Slaughter After Price IncreaseDecrease 
Response to 10W0  Price Increase 
I  I  I 
D, G, and H), whereas 37% answered combinations indicating a conventional, forward- 
bending supply response (i.e., combinations B, C, and F). As many as  45% of the  herders 
would not change their slaughter irrespective of a price increase or decrease, indicating 
that for many reindeer herders the supply curve is nearly vertical at a slaughter level 
mainly determined by nonprice-related variables. 
A visual inspection of table 5 suggests that respondents with response combinations 
indicating backward-bending supply (D, G, and H)  have larger herds than their counter- 
parts with response combinations indicating a conventional supply response (B, C, and 
F). This result can be confirmed statistically by merging combinations D, G, and H into 
one group, and joining combinations B, C, and F to form another. The mean reindeer 
herd sizes for these two groups are then significantly separated at  the 95% level. This 
fmding supports the theoretical result that backward-bending supply is more likely to 
occur among herders with large herds. 
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n = 33,  8 = 295 
Std. Dev. = 28 
Note: Total number of respondents to both the increase and decrease questions = 263. 
No Change 
Slaughter Increase 
Slaughter Decrease  [A] 
n = 3, 8 = 317 
Std. Dev. = 145 
[Dl 
n=7,  %=421 
Std. Dev. = 52 
[GI 
n = 10, ?r = 370 
Std. Dev. = 51 
[El 
n = 119, 8  = 323 
Std. Dev. = 16 
N 
n = 25,  k  = 390 
Std. Dev. = 28 
F] 
n = 25, 8  = 234 
Std. Dev. = 29 
[I] 
n = 2, k  = 250 
Std. Dev. = 0 Bostedt  Pmtoralist Economic Behavior  393 
Table 6. Number of Respondents (n),  Mean (%),  and Standard Deviation of Rein- 
deer Herd Sizes, Distributed According to Responses to Questions Concerning 
Change in Profitability and slaughter  After Reduction in Clearcuts 
Change in Slaughter from 500/0 Reduction in Clearcut Volume 
Note: Total number of respondents to both questions = 224. 
Responses from reindeer herders to relaxed externalities were studied with two 
questions. The first asked if profitability would increase as a result of  a 50% reduction 
in the clearcut volume of  timber in the area where the respondent conducts hisher 
reindeer husbandry. Such reductions in clearcuts are assumed to increase the volume 
of  lichen for winter grazing. The second question asked how the respondent would 
change hisher slaughter of reindeer in response to such a reduction in clearcut volume 
(see appendix). Table 6 reports the results from responses to these two questions. 
Approximately 90% of  the respondents stated that the profitability of  their reindeer 
herding company would increase as a result of a 50% reduction in clearcuts. This finding 
clearly confirms that forestry causes a significant externality on reindeer husbandry. 
Of the respondents who would benefit from a reduction in clearcut volume, about 80% 
would increase their slaughter. Even so, as many as 25% of  the respondents would not 
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A dynamic economic model of a pastoralist is used to empirically analyze a unique cross- 
sectional  data set on the preferences of the Swedish  reindeer herding Saami community. 
It is found that the intrinsic utility of  being an active reindeer herder plays an 
important role in determining the supply of  reindeer meat. Empirical results from a 
survey of  Swedish reindeer herders suggest this can lead to backward-bending supply 
responses among pastoralists, as expected from the theoretical model. Results indicate 
that the probability of  an increase in the slaughter following a price decrease (i.e., a 
backward-bending supply response) increases with the stock size. Further analyses 
confirm that reindeer herders with some form of backward-bending supply curve have 
significantly larger herds than their counterparts with conventional supply responses. 
Based on responses to questions about relaxed externalities from forestry, this would 
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Slaughter Increase 
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As a pastoralist society in industrialized countries such as Sweden, Norway, and 
Finland, the Saami face, to a certain extent, different challenges than pastoralist 
societies in other parts of the  world. For instance, the choices among alternative  sources 
of  income may be more plentiful for most reindeer herders than for pastoralists in 
developing countries. Despite the intrinsic utility of  being an active reindeer herder, 
alternative,  better paid occupations may still wield a power of attraction  that is difficult 
to resist. Such differences limit the possibilities for drawing inferences from the results 
presented in this paper. Furthermore, because  this study is an analysis of  a 
transhumance pastoralist society, the  results do not immediately carry over to nomadic 
pastoralist societies. 
Future research should pay closer attention to the economic situation of  the 
pastoralist societies. Many of these societies are  under considerable stress caused by the 
small margins for livelihood on the  often arid lands they inhabit as  well as  externalities 
from other resource users. Estimation of the  opportunity costs created by these external- 
ities remains an  important task, as well as further analysis of the economic behavior of 
pastoralist herders. 
[Received June 2004;jhal  revision received June 2005.1 
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Appendix: 
English Version of Selected Questions 
from the 1999 Statistics Sweden 
Mail Survey of Swedish Reindeer Herders 
(The  complete, original questionnaire was in Swedish and contained 29 questions.) 
Question 11. How important is it for  you to be a reindeer herder?  [check one alternative] 
[  I  I will quit as a reindeer herder if1  can find an occupation that will provide the 
same income. 
[  I  I will quit as a reindeer herder if I can find an occupation that will provide a 
better income. 
[  I  I will not personally quit as a reindeer herder. 
[  I  I will not personally quit as a reindeer herder, and it is important to me that the 
next generation continues in the occupation. 396  August 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Question 13. How important are the economic revenues of each year's slaughter? 
[check one alternative] 
[  I  The slaughter revenues determine if1 can continue as  a reindeer herder or not. 
[  I  The slaughter revenues are important for my livelihood, but it is the combina- 
tion of revenues &om slaughter, hunting, and fishing that determine if I can 
continue as a reindeer herder. 
[  I  Slaughter revenues are  important, but I can supplement them with income from 
other occupations. 
[  I  Slaughter revenues only give a small contribution to my livelihood. 
[  I  Slaughter revenues are not important for my livelihood. 
Question 21a. How would the yearly total profitability for  your reindeer herding company change 
if the clearcut area were reduced by 50% within the region where you conduct reindeer husbandry? 
[check one alternative] 
Profitability would be affected . .  . 
[  I  very negatively  [  I  somewhat positively 
[  I  somewhat negatively 
[ I  not at  all 
[  I  very positively 
[  1  don't know 
Note: In the analysis for  question 21a, no distinction was made between "veryn  and "somewhat," i.e.,  the two 
negative categories were merged into one. Accordingly, the two  positive categories were also merged into one. 
Question 21b. If  you  answered that profitability  would be changed in Question 21a, then how 
would you change your slaughter of reindeer? [check one alternativel 
My slaughter would be . . . 
[  I  decreased very much 
[ ]  decreased somewhat 
[ I  increased somewhat 
[ I  increased very much 
[  I  not changed at  all  [  1  don't know 
Note: In the analysis for question 21b, no distinction was made between "veryn  and "somewhat," i.e.,  the two 
decrease categories were merged into one. Accordingly, the two increase categories were also merged into one. 
Question 22. How would you as a reindeer owner change your slaughter (of  reindeer per year) if 
the  present price per kilogram was changed in the following ways? 
(a) The  present price per kilogram on reindeer meat was doubled? [check one alternative] 
[  1  1 would DECREASE  my slaughter  [ ]  I would INCREASE my slaughter 
[ ]  I would NOT CHANGE my slaughter  [  1  I don't know 
(b) The  present price per kilogram on reindeer meat was halved? [check one alternative] 
[  1  1 would DECREASE my slaughter  [  1  I would INCRWE my slaughter 
[  1  1 wodd NOT CHANGE my slaughter  [  1  I don't know 